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STUDENT NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEPARATION OF PowEms - WATmE
Pownm ACT. - The West Virginia Water Power Act of 1929' was
drafted paternalistically to encourage a tardy development "in
order to conserve and utilize the energy of the power streams".'
It exacted only a small annual charge from the licensee rather
than a royalty on gross revenue derived from the sale of power.'
It made the license practically perpetual.' The membership of
the Public Service Commission, together with the Governor,
formed a body to investigate the effects of any proposed develop-
ment, and to grant a license only when the advantages substantial-
ly exceeded the disadvantages from the viewpoint of the State
as a whole and the people thereof. Any party of record could
appeal as a matter of right from any final decision of the com-
mission to the circuit court of Kanawha County with a trial do
novo on the original record before the commission and upon any
additional evidence offered and, thereafter, appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeals in the usual manner.' Assuming to
protect the public interest, several citizens actively opposed an
application for a license for the so-called Cheat River project and
challenged the validity of the act upon constitutional grounds.'
Held, that the legislature cannot commit to the executive or
judiciary primarily legislative powers, that the entire act is in-
valid as an illegal delegation of such powers to the Governor and
to the circuit court, and that the application for the license be
dismissed. Hodges v. Public Service Commission.!
We are not concerned here with the wisdom of the particular
economic theory which the legislature adopted, but rather with
the administrative features of the act. The court recognized the
IActs of 1929, c. 58; W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9; Simonton,
Thw West Virginia Water Power Act (1930) 37 W. VA. L. Q. I.
2W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9, § 1.
8W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9, § 6.
'W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9, § 4; Simonton, op. cit. supra n. 1,
at 9-10, 29-31.
'W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9, §§ 1-3.
OW. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 9, § 13; Simonton, op. cit. supra n.
1, at 54-55.
7The Circuit Court of Kanawha County adjudged the act constitutional,
but reversed the Commission's order granting the license, and remanded the
proceedings. The power company appealed, and the citizens cross-assigned
error in the decision as to the constitutionality of the act.
8159 S. E. 834 (W. Va. 1931).
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familiar presumption in favor of the validity of legislation.' That
it reached a contrary result is not surprising, however, in view
of the court's historical approach. Treating the separation of
powers doctrine legalistically will inevitably produce inconsist-
encies. As to an earlier water power act providing for no ap-
peal from the decision of the commission, it was decided that no
right of -appeal existed to the exercise of the legislative function
of granting franchises."° Apparently such delegation of legisla-
tive power to the commission is valid in spite of a decision that
members of the commission are executive officers.' Numerous
cases hold that rate-making is legislative, that only final orders
of the commission will be reviewed under the statutory right of
appeal, and that findings of the commission will only be disturbed
when it has acted arbitrarily either contrary to the evidence or
without supporting evidence." But later the court extended its
jurisdiction to experimental orders as well." An act providing
Supreme Court control over the action of the attorney-general
in approving a bond issue was upheld because it was considered
purely administrative not involving discretion, but one judge be-
lieved that this gave the court power to compel an executive of-
ficer to perform an act in a manner contrary to his judgment."
An act conferring power on circuit courts to revoke a city
ordinance on petition of ten tax-payers is an invalid delegation
of legislative power,' but acts empowering such courts to issue
certificates of incorporation to cities, towns and villages,"' or to
0 Supra n. 8, at 835.
0Royal Glen Lumber Co. v. P. S. C., 91 W. Va. 446, 113 S. E. 749 (1922);
Howell v. P. S. C., 78 W. Va. 664, 90 S. E. 105 (1916).
"Well v. Black, 76 W. Va. 685, 86 S. E. 666 (1915).
"Harrisville v. P. S. C., 103 W. Va. 526, 138 S. E. 99 (1927) ; United Fuel
Gas Co. v. P. S. C., 103 W. Va. 306, 138 S. E. 388 (1927); Huntington v.
P. S. C., 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S. E. 144 (1926); Pittsburgh, etc., Gas Co.
v. P. S. C., 101 W. Va. 63, 132 S. E. 497 (1926); B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. P. S.
C., 99 W. Va. 670, 130 S. E. 131 (1925); B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., 90
W. Va. 1, 110 S. E. 475 (1922); Huntington v. P. S. C., 89 W. Va. 703,
110 S. E. 192 (1921); Kelly Axe Mfg. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 87 W.
Va. 368, 105 S. E. 152 (1920); Charleston v. P. S. C., 86 W. Va. 536, 103
S. E. 673 (1920); Mill Creek Coal Co. v. P. S. C., 84 W. Va. 662, 100 S.
E. 557 (1919); N. & W. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., 82 W. Va. 408, 96 S. E. 62
(1918); B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. P. S. C., 81 W. Va. 457, 94 S. E. 545 (1917);
Bluefield v. Bluefield Water Co., 81 W. Va. 201, 94 S. E. 121 (1917); State
v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 76 W. Va. 399, 85 S. E. 714 (1915); United Fuel Gas
Co. v. P. S. C., 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931 (1914).
"Charleston v. P. S. C., 83 W. Va. 718, 99 S. E. 63 (1919). But of.
Bluefield v. Bluefield Water Co., supra n. 12, refusing to review an ex-
perimental order.
" State v. England, 86 W. Va. 508, 516, 103 S. E. 400, 404 (1920).
Shephard v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635 (1887).
Elder v. Incorporators of Central City, 40 W. Va. 222, 21 S. E. 738
(1895) ; In re Town of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894).
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review tax assessments of the Board of Public Works7 are valid
since the constitution confers on circuit courts, as an arm of the
legislature, 8 such "supervisory jurisdiction as may be prescribed
by law"" The court in the Water Power case on a reconsidera-
tion determined that "supervisory jurisdiction" as limited by the
article on separation of powers meant a "juridical jurisdiction"
and that circuit courts could not aid, therefore, in administering
the water power act which involved a matter of state-wide interest.
It recognized as an established practice but did not approve a
limited breakdown of the doctrine as to such local matters as in-
corporating cities and reviewing assessments.'
The provision making the Governor a member of the com-
mission might have been upheld.' If we distinguish between the
delegation of the power to make law and the delegation of the
authority to execute a law, the powers delegated to the commission
may be said to be purely administrative and not legislative. The
legislature assumed the responsibility of making the primary
declaration of policy as to water power development.' It out-
lined the conditions under which licenses should be awarded, and
set out guide-posts for the determination of facts upon which the
act would operate to accomplish the intent of the legislature.'
Proceedings before the commission are certainly not legislative
in the sense of establishing law to be applied to future cases, but
7Wheeling Bridge Co. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S. E. 551 (1894);
Mackin v. Taylor County Court, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S. E. 632 (1893).
"In re Town of Union Mines, supra n. 16, at 182.
19 W. Va. Const., art. 8, § 12.
W. Va. Const., art 5, § 1.
2Hodges v. P. S. C., supra n. 8, at 836, where the court further said:
"Recognizing the force of that inhibition (i. e. constitutional separation of
powers) .... it 'necessarily follows' if an act, 'in any degree, requires the
circuit court to exercise legislative powers, it is to that extent void'. We
are mindful that courts have not drawn 'abstract analytical lines of separa-
tion' (37 HARV. L. REV. 1014) between the departments, and that there is
some overlapping of judicial and administrative duties." But, the court
concluded that "the plain language of article 5 calls, not for construction,
but only for obedience," since encroachnents are only proper when incidental
to the performance of legitimate judicial functions. Is the West Virginia
Constitution any more sacred in this respect than the Federal Constitution?
In Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189, 211, 48 S. Ct. 480, 485
(1928), Mr. Justice Holmes said: "It does not seem to need argument to
show that however we may disguise it by veiling words, we do not, and
can not carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision, and divide the branches into watertight compart-
ments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that
it is, or that the Constitution requires."
= The writer acknowledges that much of the argumentative material here
is drawn from brief of counsel in the Water Power Case.
2W. VA. REv. Co E (1931) c. 31, art. 9, § 1.
"W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) e. 31, art. 9, §§ 3, 6.
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seem to be "quasi-judicial'' in determining the rights of the in-
dividual applicant. On the same reasoning the United States
Supreme Court has held that conferring power to alter tariff
rates on the President with the advice of the Tariff Commission
is not void as an improper delegation of legislative power."
Accepting the court's view that the delegation of power is
legislative, the provisions for review by the circuit court, as in the
cases involving Workmen's Compensation7 and rate regulation,'
might have been construed to confer only original jurisdiction to
review the commission's orders as to purely judicial matters. The
United States Supreme Court has gone even further in rate cases
in permitting review of findings of fact as well as law.? The
crux of the problem is in the even more radical authorization of
the circuit court to receive new evidence as well as the original
record before the commission, since plausibly this makes the court
the real administrator of the act. How far, if at all, the decision
rested on this factor is difficult to determine. It has been sug-
gested as a possible construction to uphold the act that the circuit
court be bound to give great weight to the commission's findings of
fact, especially when the new evidence is cumulative.' Quaere:
should the innovation as to new evidence be sufficient alone to
invalidate an act?"
2The term "quasi-judicial" has been used by our own court, State v.
B. & 0. By. Co., 76 W. Va. 399, 407, 85 S. E. 714, 718 (1915).
" Hampton v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348 (1928). Similarly as to
the delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury of certain administrative
powers to enforce the income tax act, Brushaber v. Union P. Ry. Co., 240
U. S. 1, 36 S. Ct. 236 (1916). For a full discussion of the problem as to
federal executive officials see Welch, The Flexible Provsions of the Tariff
Act (1926) 13 VA. L. REV. 206.
'fDeConstantin v. P. S. C., 75 W. Va. 32, 83 S. E. 88 (1914).
3Supra n. 12.
2" Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S. Ct.
527 (1920) (construing a statute authorizing a commission to fix charges of
public service corporations to be powerless to withhold from the courts the
authority to determine the question of confiscation according to their own
independent judgment). But of. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261
U. S. 428, 43 S. Ct. 445 (1923) (invalidating a congressional enactment in-
sofar as it attempted to confer jurisdiction on the United States Supreme
Court to exercise legislative power on review, but upholding the same as to
the courts of the District of Columbia under their peculiar jurisdiction. The
water power act seems to be within this decision, however, since the appeal
from the circuit court's decision to the Supreme Court of Appeals was to
be upon the record in the circuit court in the usual manner).
0 This suggestion is from brief of counsel.
" The objection to the reception of new evidence by the circuit court is
that the court in effect must exercise legislative power, but the United States
Supreme Court in the Keller case, supra n. 29, apparently saw no objection
to the exercise of legislative power by state courts saying "Congress may
clothe courts of the district (of Columbia), not only with the jurisdiction and
4
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The court, receding from the position to which past decisions
might logically impel it, draws an arbitrary line in applying the
separation of powers doctrine strictly to a matter of state-wide in-
terest. It cites in bold relief a United States Supreme Court de-
cision of 1880 extolling this doctrine.' Time has disproved earlier
fears. Aside from the growth of commissions, the instances have
been comparatively few in which the legislature has sought to
burden greatly other branches of government. The proper func-
tion of this doctrine is not to establish a system of checks and
balances.' More recent decisions treat it as a testing instrument
of the reasonableness of the legislature's administrative scheme
under the differing circumstances of cases and times." If the
water power act is unconstitutional, it is because the administra-
tive features are unreasonable and not because of an invalid delega-
tion of power. The legislature has declared its policy as to water
power development, and its wisdom in such matters should not be
judicially questioned. If the power to regulate exists, the fact
that the l;gislature has created additional safeguards by executive
supervision and judicial review, should not invalidate the act
because of Montesquian conceptions of the division of power.
-BERNARD ScLovE.
CoRPoRATIoNs - DisABaTY OF CORPORATION TO ACT AS Av-
FECTING FiDUciARY DUTY OF DIRECTOR TO STOCKHOLDER. - The
Columbia Oil Company (hereafter called the Columbia) is a cor-
poration whose principal office is at Sistersville, West Virginia.
It was successful and had properties in a number of states. A
decision was made (which was probably well known to all stock-
holders) to enter the Wyoming field, and the Big Horn Oil & Gas
powers of Federal courts in the several states, but with such authority as a
State may confer on her courts".
aKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377 (1880). But
Laski, Authority in the Modern State (1919) 70, 71, writes: "The one ob-
vious method by which the past sought refuge from the dangers of authority
has proved in fact elusive (referring to this doctrine). It is in fact a paper
merit for the simple reason that in practice it is largely unworkable. The
business of government does not admit any exact division into categories".
1See Green, The Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 2 ILL. L.
BuLL. 373-416.
8'"In determining what it (one branch of government) may do in seeking
assistance from other branches, the extent and character of that assistance
must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the
governmental coordination," per Taft, C. J., Hampton and Co. v. U. S.,
276 U. S. 394, 406, 48 S. Ct. 348, 351 (1928).
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